In offering his analysis of the concepts of the good and the just, the author combines certain techniques of social science with a philosophical reflection upon certain fundamental issues. It is the objective of this book to establish a balanced approach differing from relativism and historicism on the one hand, and normative absolutism on the other. The task is not an easy one; many may view the attempt here to be less than conclusive, though it is certainly challenging. Essentially the (...) book argues for a concept of human nature that is "dispositional," and defined contextually, but in some sense not bound to circumstances in the way in which the historicist would have it. Kaplan utilizes the principles of "systems analysis," explained in detail in the first chapter of the book, to reach this contextual understanding of human nature. It is by identification of social systems as homeostatic that the argument is advanced that units of social and political analysis cannot be treated in the abstract, nor can they be understood without acknowledging contextual rules that are in some sense objective. (shrink)

Unger has written a thoughtful but problematic study of the shortcomings of liberal political theory. The specific method of the critique is his own, but it is well-structured and readable. The problem is that the precise nature of the "liberal psychology" and "liberal political theory" under attack is never very clear. This lack of clarity stands in marked contrast to the general tone of the work. One can assume with some justification that the author sees the classic core of the (...) liberal doctrine "in the work of Thomas Hobbes, of his contemporaries, and of his successors...." Nevertheless, the doctrine addressed by the author appears to be of much wider scope; Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Kant are all called in "to illustrate rather than to prove their adherence to the doctrines that are the subject of the critique." It is with reservations concerning the subject under attack that one must approach this study. (shrink)

The strength of this book is not a novelty of analysis, but rather its clarity and readability. The author intends it to be a useful teaching tool, "a genuine introduction, presupposing neither background in philosophy nor familiarity with the issues...." It is well arranged and quite successful as an introductory commentary. The book would appear to work best as a secondary source, supplementing more extensive philosophical texts. It need not be limited to courses specifically dealing with social and political philosophy. (...) The first chapter offers an elementary explanation of the nature of philosophical discourse in general; chapters three, "Freedom," and five "Utilitarianism and Justice," would be useful in a course on ethics. (shrink)

A collection of essays, six of which appear in English for the first time, focusing on various problems of positivistic philosophy, this book treats such issues as the adaption of natural science methodology to sociology, the problem of generalization in the social sciences, and the implications of science for social values. These essays are argumentative in tone, and often interrelated; the editor has provided a well balanced selection of spokesmen for the diverse points of view represented. Professor Giddens’ introduction is (...) itself a valuable essay. He offers both an historical introduction to the articles and an interesting explanation of the common themes that required their inclusion in the collection. Basically, he appears to be concerned with an attempt "to impose some order upon the flux of differing usages" of the term "positivism." He sees the positivistic attitude in sociology as including certain methodological, analytical, and technical presuppositions. The collection is intended to explicate these presuppositions. (shrink)

The author here presents a series of significant, thoughtful, and well-written essays which are united by their common concern with man and his social world. The book is subtitled "Essays on the Coherence and Deformation of Social Reality." The essays, particularly in Part One, offer an introduction to and a defense of the phenomenological approach to philosophy, though Natanson does tend to slant his reading in an existentialist direction. He strongly objects to recent attempts to bridge the gap between the (...) "empirical-positivistic" and the "conceptual-phenomenological" modes of analysis by the oversimplification of the latter’s methodological postulates. Though this position may solidify differences between the two schools, Natanson’s concern for the integrity of the phenomenological method is noteworthy. (shrink)

This is a timely critique of contemporary Marxist theory, its implications for social structure, and its practical dilemmas. Three themes appear throughout: the mythologizing of Marx, the rationale of Revolution, and the significance of history for social philosophy. Contrary to the approach of many commentators, Hook emphasizes the tremendous differences between the "early" and "late" Marx. He insists that "to judge Marx’s meaning by his own intent, we must go to the published works for which Marx took public responsibility." In (...) the course of the discussion, the author criticizes contemporary Marxist theory. It has itself become an "ideology," a mythology with an uncritical belief in the seemingly universal solution to human ills offered by the socialization of the means of production through revolution. Hook emphasizes that the tone of later Marxist writings, particularly Capital, had gradually shifted away from any belief in the inevitability of violent revolution. From this perspective the author traces the ambiguities of Marx’s writings that afforded the opportunity for Leninist-Stalinist revisionism on this and other issues. Hook is suspicious of the facile and selective exegesis of Marx’s writings used to support the political bias of many commentators. Revolution itself has become a symbol, which, in the author’s view, is often taken up uncritically to support a myth of society. In this context Hook has an enlightening discussion of the putative "right" to revolution. It is essentially an extralegal power, legitimate only where the context of the historical events makes intralegal change absolutely impossible. The author is therefore disturbed by the "cult of revolution" which uses a mythologized Marx to support a program of deliberate, episodic violence as a strategy of social change. The significance of historical experience is evident throughout these later chapters, particularly where Hook undertakes a reevaluation of the Bolshevik Revolution. The historical and philosophical misconceptions underlying ideologies of violence are the most frequent subjects of his criticism. These ideologies have sought to draw moral support from legitimizing examples of history, as well as from the mythologized Marx. Hook goes to great lengths to deny them any such support. Hook concludes with an examination of the emerging scheme of human rights, insisting that they must be understood in their historical context, and that democratic principles are the key to their full realization. (shrink)

Professor Grünfeld’s book puts forward the thesis that the hard and fast lines that have been drawn between philosophy and science, as well as between the hard and soft sciences, are inaccurate and possibly illusory. He contends that values, as a function of philosophy, are related to science in various complex ways. In a sense, his approach involves a collapsing of metascientific and scientific disciplines into one another. This thesis is applied to the analysis of historical method, language, and philosophy (...) of science. The author covers a wide range of topics in a thorough and well documented fashion. His examination of Popper’s approach to history and scientific method, though by no means elementary, serves as an excellent introduction to that particular area of philosophy of science. A considerable portion of the book is devoted to a linguistic analysis of interrelated problems of logic, methodological models, and metaphysics. On the basis of that discussion, the author presents two thoughtful chapters on the implications of his thesis for philosophy of science, one concerning the concept of "self-evidence" in science, the other examining the relation between observation and theory. (shrink)

This work is a defense of positivism in social theory: Addis is committed to the view that the substantive concerns of physical and social science are essentially the same. Indeed, he states that an adequate philosophy of society presupposes an adequate philosophy of science. He therefore begins with an analysis of various themes from the latter: causation, the notions of process and closed systems, and determinism. It is in fact a basic presumption of the book that some refined theory of (...) determinism is true. The author argues that all "social objects," such as those posited by Durkheim, are no more than properties of, or relations between, individual social beings. In the course of this argument, he develops a detailed treatment of reduction of the social into the physical sciences. It is his belief that logical analysis of the notion of reduction is essential to an understanding of social theory. Reduction is examined in two phases. First, he elaborates on his contention that social objects reduce to individual human beings. Second, he examines the reduction of socio-historical explanations to psycho-physical laws. He then proceeds to apply the preceding discussions to problems of philosophy of history, the relation of ideas to historical process, freedom and purpose in history, and a critique of "Marxism.". (shrink)

Lodge’s thoughtful study is a mixture of political science, history, and economics drawn together by a central philosophical theme. The author seeks to explore the issue of the legitimacy of social institutions, and he raises certain questions concerning the nature of man in society as well as the relationship between ideology and social values. In his view, the dominant social institutions that grew with the United States were founded upon a "Lockean" ideology. At the core of this ideology was the (...) concept of man as an atomistic unit. Reflecting this concept, the traditional American ideology stressed five components: first, individualism as the basic social value; second, property as the guarantee of human rights; third, competition as the dynamic of social interaction; fourth, the limited state; fifth, scientific/technological specialization. Lodge reviews the development of this ideology and argues that it has led to an ever-increasing fragmentation of society and a frustration of social purpose. As the Lockean paradigm proved itself inadequate to resolve problems in a world of interdependent and interwoven social wholes, the need for a new American ideology became apparent. (shrink)